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PUBLIC FORUM
Mortmain statutes have been whittled away at by state legisla-
tures,8 ' evaded by estate planners, 5 and criticized by scholars and
practicing lawyers.8 6 Finally they have been invalidated by the courts.
The combination of In re Small, In re Estate of CavilI, and Doyle v. Key
represents a frontal attack on the mortmain statute as an anachronistic
feudal holdover. Other courts confronted with challenges to mortmain
statutes should consider whether a state's role in policing the distribution
of a decedent's estate ought to extend beyond guaranteeing dependent
heirs continued support. Invalidation of a mortmain statute does not
deny those heirs a right to complain of undue influence by an offending
charitable organization. Rather, the intervention of the courts leaves
that remedy healthy while, hopefully, tolling the demise of the mortmain
statute.
ELIZABETH ANANIA
Constitutional Law-Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad:
A Contemporary Concept of the Public Forum
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad' the United States
Supreme Court held that municipal auditoriums in Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee "were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities."2 The Court looked in part to the traditional public forum
cases (those involving streets and parks) "I for the relevant criteria for its
84. E.g., "By recent amendment the Idaho mortmain statute now permits an
unlimited bequest to charity even within the proscribed thirty-day period, provided the
first $100,000 goes to the lineal descendants of the testator." I W. BOWE & D. PARKER,
supra note 4, § 3.16, at 1973-74 Supp. 15 (footnote omitted); see also Restrictions, supra
note 5, at 297.
85. Various "avoidance techniques" are catalogued in Fisch, Restrictions on Chari-
table Giving, 10 N.Y.L.F. 307, 325-31 (1964). These include substitutional and
conditional dispositions, in terroram and no-contest clauses, dependent relative revoca-
tion, contracts to bequeath and inter vivos dispositions.
86. Id.; Hollinger, Decedents' Estates & Trusts Laws, Annual Survey of Pennsyl-
vania Legal Developments, 45 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 221, 229 (1974); Remick, supra note 66;
and Restrictions, supra note 5, at 298-99.
1. 420U.S. 546 (1975).
2. Id. at 555.
3. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
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conclusion, and thus demonstrated that the application of these histori-
cal tests is not to be confined to the particular settings in which they
were developed. As a result, the Court did more than declare two
municipal auditoriums in Chattanooga to be public forums: it evidenced
a willingness to apply public forum analysis whenever a public facility is
denied to those who desire to exercise their first amendment rights.
When the Municipal Auditorium Board of the City of Chattanooga
rejected Southeastern's application for the production of the rock musi-
cal "Hair" solely on the strength of outside reports that the production
was obscene, the petitioner sought injunctive relief in the federal courts.'
Although both the district court5 and the court of appeals" upheld the
Board's action, finding conduct in the production, apart from speech, to
be obscene and thus violative of city and state laws against public
nudity, 7 the Supreme Court reversed.' The Court was not concerned
with whether the play were obscene or not,' refusing even to review the
reasons behind the Board's rejection of it, or the standards upon which
the Board had based its decision.'0 Rather, the majority chose to view
the main issue before the Court as whether the Board in its managerial
capacity could function as do private individual proprietors-outside the
strictures of the first and fourteenth amendments." Finding the audito-
rium to be a public forum, the Court emphatically repudiated the
(1939). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
4. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465, 468 (E.D. Tenn.
1972).
5. Id. at 477.
6. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 486 F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1973).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1013, 39-3003 (1971 Supp.); CHArTANOOGA, TENN.,
CODE §§ 6-4, 25-28. See 420 U.S. at 550-51. The Court rejected the Board's argument
that it would itself violate the law if it approved Southeastern's application: "Hair" had
not been judicially declared to be obscene, and "respondents did not parmit the show
to go on and rely on law enforcement authorities to prosecute for anything illegal that
occurred. Rather, they denied the application in anticipation that the production would
violate the law." Id.
8. 420 U.S. at 552.
9. Id. at 557-59. Accord, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334
F. Supp. 634, 639 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See also Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58
(1970); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
10. 420 U.S. at 552, 559, 562. The Board had looked to a booklet prepared for the
dedication of the auditorium to find support for its actions. The booklet stated in part
that the Board was entrusted with the responsibility of insuring that "civic, education-
al, patriotic and charitable organizations and associations may have a common meeting
place to discuss and further the upbuilding and general welfare of the city and
surrounding territory." Further, the auditorium was "to be devoted for cultural
advancement, and for clean, healthful, entertainment which will make for the upbuilding
of a better citizenship." See id. at 549 n.4. See also note 61 infra.
11. 420 U.S. at 553-56.
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Board's claims of proprietary privilege.' 2 Public officials charged with
the management of a public facility that is found to be a public forum
must recognize the constitutional limitations upon their proprietary
discretion. The Board's failure to appreciate the nature of its responsi-
bility led it to deny the use of the auditorium without regard for the
procedural safeguards dictated by the first amendment.' 3 Therefore,
the Court concluded, without reaching questions of the validity of the
Board's standards, that "[dienying use of the municipal facility under
the circumstances present here constituted the prior restraint."14  Be-
cause this prior restraint was accomplished without adherence to the
minimum procedural requirements of Freedman v. Maryland,'5 the
Board's refusal was impermissible. 16
Holding that a municipal auditorium could indeed be a public
forum, the Court provided itself with the basis for a due process analysis
of petitioner's claims.17 Clearly, one of the most valued incidents of
private ownership is the right to exclude others, and to regulate their
conduct once admitted, without breaking first amendment command-
12. The Auditorium Board had advanced the claim in the district court that, acting
in a proprietary capacity, it should be accorded the managerial discretion allowed to
private owners. Although the district court ruled against this contention, see note 64
infra, it was again argued on brief to the Supreme Court. The Court's answer was that
"[r]espondent's action was no less a prior restraint because the public facility under their
control happened to be municipal theaters." 420 U.S. at 555.
13. Professor Monaghan has coined the term "First Amendment due process" to
describe the approach that the Supreme Court has adopted to handle the procedural
issues presented in first amendment cases. Surveying a long series of cases, capped by
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), he observes that, "the Court has placed
little reliance upon the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
but instead has turned directly to the first amendment as the source of the rules....
[D]oes the procedure show 'the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression?' [380
U.S. at 48]" Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 518-
19 (1970).
14. 420 U.S. at 556.
15. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Freedman the Court held that where a prior restraint
is imposed which calls into question the protected nature of speech, "only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. at 58.
Therefore, (1) the burden is on the state to either issue a permit or initiate judicial
proceedings, (2) any restraint prior to judicial review must be brief, preserving the status
quo, and (3) a prompt judicial determination must be provided. Id. at 58-59.
16. Not all prior restraints are unconstitutional. See note 60 and accompanying
text infra. See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
17. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court refused
to find a municipal bus system to be an appropriate public forum. Therefore, the city
was allowed to prohibit political advertising on its buses even though other commercial
advertising was permitted. See note 54 infra. Thus, because "[n]o First Amendment
forum is here to be found," the Court held that, "[i]n these circumstances there is no
First or Fourteenth Amendment violation." 418 U.S. at 304. See also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), discussed in text accompanying note 36 infra.
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ments. 18 Likewise, municipal properties, never expressly dedicated for
purposes of free expression, are not necessarily of right open to all peo-
ple as a public forum.' 9 However, once a place has been declared by
the courts to be a public forum the first and fourteenth amendments
are called into play, and property "rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." 0 The ease
with which the Court moved the idea of the public forum out of the
streets and indoors is not without support in the principal cases which
have shaped the public forum concept.
The first pronouncement of a modem theory of the public forum
came in 1939 when the United States Supreme Court, in Hague v.
C.I.O.,2' overruled Davis v. Massachusetts"2 which had confirmed in the
states unlimited control over access to, and the use of their public parks
and streets.23 In Hague the Court upheld the right of labor activists to
peacefully assemble, speak and distribute literature in the city streets,
and therefore struck down the licensing ordinance which had been used
arbitrarily to deny them a forum. The Court explicitly renounced the
absolute dominion contentions of Davis, postulating what has been
called "a kind of first amendment easement"'2 4 right to a public forum
in the people:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
18. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972): "In addressing this
issue, it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the
rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the
owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only." Id. at
567. Cf. Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) and Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where even privately owned properties, opened to the
public, were found to be public forums. See generally Comment, The Public Forum
from Marsh to Lloyd, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 159 (1974).
19. See cases cited note 17 supra.
20. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
21. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
22. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
23. The Court in Davis quoted with approval the language of then Justice Holmes
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
"There is no evidence before us to show that the power of the legislature
over the common is less than its power over any other park dedicated to the use
of the public, or over public streets, the legal title to which is in a city or town.
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."
167 U.S. at 47, quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).




Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citi-
zens. 25
Thus, in order to give meaning to first amendment guarantees, a state is
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment from divesting the public of
access to these historical forums.
26
The Court, in Hague, confined its opinion to a narrowly conceived
concept of the public forum, based on common law property notions:
27
only the streets and parks were considered. Although the rationale of
Hague has continued to be applicable in the streets and parks cases, 28 in
recent years, as local governments assumed an increased role in the
development of public facilities, it began to be questioned whether the
right to a public forum were to be restricted to these traditional public
places. In two major civil rights cases of the 1960's, Brown v. Louisi-
ana29 and Adderley v. Florida,"° the Supreme Court indicated its answer,
displaying a disposition to adopt a more generalized approach to public
forum analysis.
In Brown five blacks staged a sit-in demonstration in a public
library, in protest of segregated library facilites, and were arrested when
they refused to disburse.31 Reversing their convictions, the Court found
unconstitutional state action in the discriminatory enforcement of a local
ordinance prohibiting disruptive conduct in public buildings. 32 After
noting that the demonstrations had been conducted in a quiet and
peaceful manner, the Court declared such conduct to be fully protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments,3 3 and affirmed the right of the
petitioners to stage a "reasonable, orderly, and limited" protest in a
public facility where they had "every right to be. 34  Although not
historically a public forum, the library was elevated to that status
through the combined effect of the first amendment and the equal
protection clause. But, as the majority was careful to acknowledge, had
25. 307 U.S. at 515.
26. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1937).
27. See generally Kalven, supra note 24; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233.
28. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Staub v.
City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
29. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
30. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
31. 383 U.S. at 136-38.
32. Id. at 142.
33. Id. at 139-42.
34. Id. at 142.
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there been "disturbance of others, . . . disruption of library activi-
ties, . . .violation of any library regulations," the issue presented
would -have been quite different.35 Thus it is clear that the Court, in
finding a public forum, looked beyond traditional concepts to other
relevant considerations: (1) was the place open to the public; (2)
would the form of speech advocated interfere with the normal functions
to which -the facility was committed; (3) did the state by its actions deny
equal access to an appropriate forum for protected expression?
The next year in Adderley 8 the Court was called upon to consider
the public forum issue again, this time in the light of Brown. Demon-
strators were convicted of trespass when they refused to leave the
grounds of a county jail.37 The Supreme Court affirmed their convic-
tions, answering each of the questions suggested in Brown against
contentions that the jail was a suitable public forum. The jail premises
were not open to the public, at any time, as a forum for expressive
activities,38 because such activity was inconsistent with the security
purposes for which the jail was built.39 Therefore, over a strong dissent
which viewed the jail as "an obvious center for protest," 40 the majority
found the jail to be "so clearly committed to other purposes that [its]
use for the airing of grievances is anomalous."'41  Finding no public
forum, the Court upheld the statute which gave to the state the "power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.
42
By the 1970's the Supreme Court was ready to announce an
approach -to public forum analysis that in no way depended upon the
accidents of history. Summarizing the developments in Brown and
Adderley, the Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford43 formulated its
test:
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate
the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reason-
able." Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a pub-
35. Id.
36. 385U.S. 39 (1966).
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id. at 47.
39. Id. at 41, 45.
40. Id. at 49.
41. Id. at 54. Although the words are those of Justice Douglas, admitting in his
dissent that not every public place is also a suitable public forum, I have chosen to
appropriate them as the best statement of the case holding: the majority took Justice
Douglas at his word.
42. Id. at 47.
43. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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lie library, Brown v. Louisiana, making a speech in the reading
room almost certainly would. That same speech should be per-
fectly appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal ac-
tivity of a particular place at a particular time.
44
In Grayned, students picketing a high school on adjacent sidewalks were
arrested and fined for violating a municipal ordinance banning disrup-
tive noise and conduct near school buildings while classes were in
session. 4' Reaffirming its holding in Tinker v., Des Moines School
District4" that a school campus can be an appropriate public forum,
47
the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the ordinance as a constitution-
ally permissible time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect
school activities.4" Thus, it is necessary to consider the purposes to
which a public facility is devoted, first in order to determine whether its
use as a public forum would be inconsistent with that purpose, and
second, so that reasonable standards for time, place, and manner regula-
tions can be devised.
Although the test as stated in Grayned casts public forum analysis
primarily in terms of appropriateness of use considerations, the Supreme
Court, on the same day that it decided Grayned, found a public forum
to have been created on equal access grounds. In Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley," the Court struck down a city ordinance which
allowed labor picketing near school facilities while prohibiting any other
type of picketing in the same areas.50 Such "selective exclusion" was
held to run afoul of both the equal protection clause and the first
amendment. 51 Public places open to some must be open to all; and if
appropriate as forums for some points of view, such places must be
44. Id. at 116 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 105-06.
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Court upheld the right of students to
wear black armbands to protest against the war in Vietnam, as long as their conduct did
not substantially interfere with school functions.
47. 408 U.S. at 117.
48. Id. at 121.
49. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
50. Id. at 94.
51. Necessarily then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the
First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, govern-
ment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say.
Id. at 96. Accord, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (concurring opinion);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
19761
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made available to all points of view. 52  The Court did not hesitate to
find a deprivation of public forum rights even though the state was
unaware that by its actions it had provided one.
5 3
After Grayned and Mosley it was apparent that the Court left
behind the narrow theory of the public forum conceived in Hague. In
these two opinions the Supreme Court expressed the principles of Brown
and Adderley in yet broader terms, reflecting a commitment to apply
public forum analysis in new and varying contexts. Although perhaps
the Court retreated somewhat from this stand in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights4 when it declined to find a city-owned bus to be a
"First Amendment forum," in Southeastern Promotions the Court re-
confirmed its commitment to an expansive theory of the public forum.5
The Court in Southeastern Promotions quickly tested the audito-
riums against this adaptable public forum concept, before turning to the
question of prior restraint. The petitioners did not claim the right of
access to a "facility primarily serving a competing use. Nor was
rejection of the application based on any regulation of time, place, or
manner related to the nature of the facility or applications from other
users."5 6  Thus it is clear that under the rationale of Grayned, the
auditoriums were not disqualified from being suitable for use as public
forums. The Auditorium Board made no attempt to justify its actions
52. See generally Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969
DuK. L.I. 931, where it is contended that, "The first amendment has developed,
through the vagueness and overbreadth line of cases, its own equal protection clause,
capable of achieving the same results as the fourteenth amendment .... " Id. at 951
(footnotes omitted).
53. Cf. Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
54. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The majority concluded that the city could constitution-
ally "[limit] access to its transit system advertising space in order to minimize chances
of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive
audience." Id. at 304. Thus it found no public forum. In a strongly worded dissent,
Justice Brennan reviewed the history of the public forum concept and concluded that the
buses were indeed public forums:
In the circumstances of this case, however, we need not decide whether
public transit cars must be made available as forums for the exercise of First
Amendment rights. By accepting commercial and public service advertising,
the city effectively waived any argument that advertising in its transit cars is
incompatible with the rapid transit system's primary function of providing
transportation. A forum for communication was voluntarily established when
the city installed the physical facilities for the advertisements and, by contract
with Metromedia, created the necessary administrative machinery for regulat-
ing access to that forum.
Id. at 313-14.
55. In fact the Court explicitly rejected the applicability of Lehman in the case at
hand. 420 U.S. at 556.
56. Id. at 555 (footnotes omitted).
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on the grounds that the auditoriums could not sufficiently accomodate
the production.57  And certainly at no time could the Board deny that it
regularly made the facilities available to others as forums for public
expression, for it was just for such purposes that the buildings were
dedicated. 58 Therefore, under the holding of Mosley a right of equal
access to the facilities for purposes of protected expression inured .to the
public as a whole. The auditoriums were indeed public forums.
Once the Court found the auditoriums to be public forums, the
ultimate disposition of the case was clearly dictated. The Board's denial
of the use of these public forums was "indistinguishable in its censor-
ing effect from the official actions consistently identified as prior re-
straints in a long line of [the] Courts decisions."" Although a prior
restraint is not unconstitutional per se,60 those who would control access
to a public forum may not go farther than to establish such limited
regulations as are not incompatible with the purposes of the forum.61
And if those standards would condition the right of access to the public
facility upon the type of expressive activity proposed, only after a
judicial determination that the speech is unprotected can the authorities
deny the use of the public forum on grounds such as obscenity.6 2
Because the Auditorium Board failed to recognize these constitutional
constraints upon its role in the management of a public forum, it
neglected to insure that its rejection of "Hair" "' [took] place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system.' "63 Although inadvertently infirm, the Board's refusal was
nevertheless effective in.cutting off public forum rights in an unconsti-
tutional manner. As such, the Board's actions could not be upheld.
57. Id.
58. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
59. 420 U.S. at 552, citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,451-52 (1938).
60. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Cf. Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
61. 420 U.S. at 553. Accord, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. at 143 (The Court
emphasized that although "[a] State or its instrumentality may, of course, regulate the
use of its libraries or other public facilities, ... it may not invoke regulations as to
use-whether they are ad hoc or general-as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in
lawful, constitutionally protected exercise of their fundamental rights."); and Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. at 515-16 ('The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks ...must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.").
62. 420 U.S. at 559-60. See also note 15 supra.
63. 420 U.S. at 559, quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58.
1976] 447
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In dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist sought to discredit the public
forum foundations of the majority opinion by resurrecting the argument
that the Board could constitutionally deny access to the auditoriums
consonant with its proprietary as opposed to its governmental duties."4
Insisting that in prior decisions the Supreme Court had limited itself to
finding a public forum only in settings functionally similar to the streets
and parks, he questioned the validity of applying the same analysis to
such dissimilar facilties as public auditoriums, "which must of ne-
cessity schedule performances by a process of inclusion and exclu-
sion."8' 5 If to find the auditoriums to be public forums is to deny any
"selective role whatsoever" to the Board in the management of them, by
what standards are managers of municipal auditoriums to decide which
speakers shall have the forum?" '66
The Court acknowledged that eventually many of the questions
raised by Justice Rehnquist would have to be resolved, but it expressly
declined to confront them in Southeastern Promotions."' At no time,
however, did the Court indicate that the Board could serve no "constitu-
tionally permissible role" in the selection of productions to be presented
in the auditoriums. The licensing standards appropriate to the streets
and parks cases are not be be transported wholesale to other forums
where they may well be inapplicable. For, "[e]ach medium of expres-
sion, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it, for each has its own problems."6 8 Assuming that
the requisite procedural safeguards were incorporated, the Board was
clearly not prohibited from establishing guidelines necessary to the
64. 420 U.S. at 570-74. The district court had rejected the proposition that
characterization of the Board's actions would help to determine the case: "Accordingly,
it is apparent that whether the Board acts in a governmental capacity or in a proprietary
capacity it nevertheless remains a public body, and as such it cannot differentiate or
discriminate where the sole basis of that differentiation or discrimination is for some
constitutionally impermissible [sic] reason." 341 F. Supp. at 470. Accord, Southeast-
em Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F.2d 282, 283 (10th Cir. 1972); Southeast-
em Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1972);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345, 351-52 (W.D.N.C.
1971). But see Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 201-03 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). See also United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44 (4th Cir.
1971); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946).
65. 420 U.S. at 570.
66. See id. at 572-74.
67. Id. at 562. "The standard, whatever it may be, must be implemented under a
system that assures prompt judicial review with a minimal restriction of First Amend-
ment rights necessary under the circumstances." Id.
68. Id. at 557, citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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successful production of theatrical programs.6 9 The Court simply re-
fused to go farther than to confirm the fact that a public forum may not
be run as if it were a privately owned facility, leaving it up to the
municipalities to develop the" 'narrow, objective, and definite standards
to guide the licensing authority' 70 required by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Southeastern Promotions are to be derived from the public forum under-
pinnings of its holding. That the Court never reached the substantive
obscenity questions raised in the lower courts should put those accounta-
ble for the management of municipal facilities on notice that they must
apprise themselves of the potential public forum- ramifications that
might well attend their actions. And since the Court refused to lay
down specific guidelines, the burden of devising sufficiently narrow
standards to govern the managing authority in its function was defaulted
to the states. Furthermore, lower courts are charged with the responsi-
bility of exploring the public forum consequences of governmental action
that would frustrate the exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, the
Court recognized that "[t]o permit the continued building of our
politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,"' '
those forums appropriately public must be kept open to constitutionally
protected expression.
JAMES M. PHILLIPS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Standing to Sue in Exdusionary Zoning
Litigation: Catch-22 Revisited
Catch-22, Yosarian observed, involved a simple test with condi-
tions defined so that it was impossible to meet them.1 In an opinion
69. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. See also Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345, 351 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
70. 420 U.S. at 553, quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969).
71. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
1. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 47 (1955).
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